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ABSTRACT
Mobile authentication is indispensable for preventing unau-
thorized access to multi-touch mobile devices. Existing mo-
bile authentication techniques are often cumbersome to use
and also vulnerable to shoulder-surfing and smudge attacks.
This paper focuses on designing, implementing, and evalu-
ating TouchIn, a two-factor authentication system on multi-
touch mobile devices. TouchIn works by letting a user draw
on the touchscreen with one or multiple fingers to unlock his
mobile device, and the user is authenticated based on the ge-
ometric properties of his drawn curves as well as his behav-
ioral and physiological characteristics. TouchIn allows the
user to draw on arbitrary regions on the touchscreen without
looking at it. This nice sightless feature makes TouchIn very
easy to use and also robust to shoulder-surfing and smudge
attacks. Comprehensive experiments on Android devices
confirm the high security and usability of TouchIn.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen the explosive growth of multi-
touch mobile devices such as iPads and Nexus 7 tablets. In
computing, multi-touch refers to the ability of sensing the
input from two or more points of contact with a touchscreen
at one time. The great demand for multi-touch technology
is largely driven by the skyrocketing quest for multi-touch
smartphones, tablets, and other consumer electronic devices.
Mobile (user) authentication—letting multi-touch mobile
devices ascertain whom they are interacting with—is nec-
essary for preventing unauthorized access to mobile devices
which store increasingly more private information. Existing
mobile authentication techniques can be broadly classified
into three paradigms: something you know such as alphanu-
meric/graphical passwords, something you have such as a
hardware token [1–4], and someone you are such as biolog-
ical and behavioral characteristics [5–13]. Multi-factor mo-
bile authentication refers to the reliance on more than one
authentication paradigm.
The something-you-know paradigm has so far been the
most widely used. For example, a simple password on iOS
devices is a 4-digit number, and the Android Pattern Lock
technique uses a graphical password as a pattern on a 9-
point grid. To input a correct password, a user has to look
at the screen and touch specific points on a virtual keyboard
or grid. Such password entry has four essential drawbacks.
First, it is cumbersome and a common frustration so that
many (if not most) people just avoid password protection
[2, 14]. Second, it is vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks
because the password can be potentially observed by mali-
cious bystanders in crowded public places [15, 16]. Third,
it is susceptible to smudge attacks [16, 17], as the user re-
peatedly touches the same points on the screen before his
password changes. Last, it is inaccessible to people with vi-
sual impairment [14], corresponding to 285 million people
worldwide [18] and 21.5 million US adults aged 18+ [19].
Although free of the above drawbacks, the other paradigms
also have limitations. In particular, the something-you-have
paradigm often requires specifically built auxiliary hardware
such as hardware tokens [1, 2] not immediately available
on the market. In addition, belonging to the someone-you-
are paradigm, biometric authentication techniques relying on
face/iris/voice/fingerprint recognition are vulnerable to well-
known spoofing mechanisms [2]. For example, the finger-
print authentication feature on the latest iPhone 5S has been
quickly broken [20, 21].
This paper presents the design, implementation, and eval-
uation of TouchIn, a two-factor authentication system for
multi-touch mobile devices as a novel solution to the afore-
mentioned issues. Our major contributions are twofold.
First, we design and implement TouchIn as a novel com-
bination of the something-you-know and someone-you-are
paradigms. TouchIn comprises two phases. In the enrollment
phase, a device owner uses one or multiple fingers to draw
arbitrary geometric curves of his own choice (called a curve
password) on his multi-touch screen. An authentication tem-
plate is then created based on features extracted from his
input, including x-coordinate, y-coordinate, direction, cur-
vature, x-velocity, y-velocity, x-acceleration, y-acceleration,
finger pressure, and hand geometry. The first four features
relate to the something-you-know paradigm and can together
accurately define the geometric characteristics of the drawn
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curve. They are incorporated based on the observation that
self-defined curves are easier for the user himself to remem-
ber and reproduce but difficult for attackers to guess. In
contrast, associated with the something-you-are paradigm,
the remaining six features correspond to the user’s behav-
iorial characteristics and physiological characteristics. They
are nearly impossible for attackers to infer and forge even if
they may manage to know the correct curve password. We
formulate the weighted combination of these features as an
optimization problem and propose a solution based on ma-
chine learning. In the subsequent authentication phase, any-
one attempting to unlock the mobile device needs to draw
on the multi-touch screen, from which a candidate template
is extracted. If the candidate and authentication templates
match, the user is allowed in.
Second, we implement TouchIn on Google Nexus 7 tablets
and evaluate its security and usability through comprehen-
sive experiments under various adversary models. Specifi-
cally, our security and usability studies involve 30 volunteers
with their eyes closed throughout the experiments to emulate
a rather constrained environment where TouchIn is used by
people with visual impairments. We show that TouchIn has
very low false positives and negatives, denying unauthorized
users for 97.7% (97.8%) of the time and admitting autho-
rized users for 97.5% (99.3%) of the time for a password
involving a single curve (multiple curves). Finally, our us-
ability survey shows that most volunteers find TouchIn easy
to use and curve passwords easy to memorize.
TouchIn does not suffer from the aforementioned draw-
backs observed with existing mobile authentication techniques.
First, it is a sightless solution in that the user can draw his
password curve without seeing the screen. There are two
major implications from this feature: (1) TouchIn is both ac-
cessible and user-friendly for sighted people and also people
with visual impairment; (2) the user can perform device un-
locking under some cover (say a briefcase or jacket) to com-
pletely thwart shoulder-surfing attacks [15, 16]. Second, the
user can draw anywhere on the touchscreen under an arbi-
trary orientation for each unlocking attempt. Finger smudges
can thus be more randomly distributed over a larger portion
of the screen instead of at some fixed points, making smudge
attacks [16, 17] much less a threat. Third, TouchIn does not
require any auxiliary hardware and is applicable to off-the-
shelf multi-touch mobile devices. Finally, TouchIn is highly
secure due to its reliance on two authentication paradigms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
surveys the related work. Section 3 introduces the multi-
touch basics. Section 4 presents the adversary model. Sec-
tion 5 analyzes some collected data to motivate our design.
Section 6 overviews the TouchIn design. Section 7 details
the enrollment phase of TouchIn. Section 8 illustrates the
verification phase of TouchIn. Section 9 evaluates the TouchIn
performance through comprehensive experiments. Section 10
concludes this paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Due to space limitations, we only brief the prior work
most germane to our TouchIn system.
In addition to alphanumeric and graphic passwords, ges-
ture passwords are associated with the something-you-know
paradigm. Bailador et al. [22] proposed to authenticate a
mobile user by letting him make a handwritten signature in
the air while holding a mobile phone, and the in-air signa-
ture is captured through the 3D accelerometer sensor perva-
sive on smartphones and tablets nowadays for comparison
with one previously stored on the phone. A similar idea
is presented in [23, 24] to use the accelerometer sensor to
capture user-created gestures. Besides being socially awk-
ward, these techniques can only be used as weak authen-
tication techniques and are vulnerable to the attackers see-
ing the users perform their in-air signatures or gestures, as
mentioned in [22–24]. In [15], a comprehensive set of five-
finger gestures are defined for multi-touch device authenti-
cation. The shape of each user performing a given gesture is
used and evaluated as his device password. The security of
this technique and the use of personalized gestures instead of
predefined ones are not fully investigated. In addition, per-
forming five-finger gestures on mobile devices with a small
display may not be user-friendly. Moreover, Kinwrite [25]
is a handwriting-based gesture authentication system, but it
requires an external device like Kinect to detect 3D hand-
writing motions. Most recently, GEAT [16] authenticates
a mobile user based on how he inputs the specific gestures
and does not fulfill the sightless requirement. Finally, Pass-
Chords [14] is the only prior work dedicated to the sight-
less requirement to the best of our knowledge. It requires
a user to tap several times on the multi-touch screen with
one or more fingers, and the sets of fingers in all the taps to-
gether compose a password for comparison with one stored
on the mobile device. Although promising results have been
shown from usability studies, the authentication failure rate
is 16.3% [14], and our experiments reveal that PassChords is
very vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks.
Online handwritten signature verification on mobile de-
vices such as [26, 27] relates to the something-you-know
paradigm as well. In such a system, a user uses a stylus to
write a handwritten signature on the touchscreen, which is
then captured and compared with a template on the device.
A handwritten signature can be regarded as a special single-
curve password in TouchIn, but the majority of publicly re-
ported systems along this line assume a stylus used for better
handwritten signature recognition. In contrast, TouchIn sup-
ports both single-curve and multi-curve authentication, relies
only on fingers for better usability, and incorporates a user’s
behavioral and physiological characteristics as well.
The something-you-have authentication paradigm often re-
quires special auxiliary devices not immediately available on
the market. Knuepfel made Signet Rings that use conductive
material to create several electrical pathways from a carrier’s
fingers to the capacitive touchscreen, and the pathways are
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arranged in a distinct pattern as a password [28]. A similar
technique with more details is introduced in [2]. In addi-
tion, the Magkey and Mickey miniature devices presented
in [1] rely on secret-embedded magnet fields and acoustic
signals detected by the smartphone’s compass sensor and
microphone, respectively. Furthermore, a wearable token is
used in [3] to keep attesting the user’s presence to his mobile
device by sending authentication messages via a short-range
wireless link (e.g., Bluetooth). Finally, the IR Ring in [4] au-
thenticates a user’s touches to a multi-touch display by trans-
mitting a cryptographic signal through the infrared channel.
In contrast, TouchIn is for off-the-shelf multi-touch mobile
devices and requires no special auxiliary devices.
The someone-you-are authentication paradigm usually de-
pends on physiological or behavioral biometrics. Physiolog-
ical biometrics relate to a person’s physical features such
as fingerprints, iris patterns, retina patterns, facial features,
palm prints, hand geometry. These features are difficult to be
accurately identified on mobile devices and also susceptible
to well-known spoofing mechanisms [2, 29]. In contrast, be-
havioral biometrics relate to a user’s behavioral patterns such
as location traces [7], gaits [8,9], keystroke patterns [10], and
touch dynamics [11, 13]. These techniques are best suitable
as secondary authentication mechanisms supplementing the
primary password-based authentication mechanism, as they
may be vulnerable to attackers familiar with the victim’s be-
havioral patterns [7, 11].
3. MULTI-TOUCH BASICS
In this section, we outline the fundamentals of multi-touch
screens to help understand TouchIn.
The history of multi-touch technology dated back to 1982,
when the University of Toronto’s Input Research Group de-
veloped the first human-input multi-touch system. A multi-
touch screen is rapidly becoming commonplace on most re-
cently shipped smartphones and tablets. Multi-touch can be
implemented in different ways such as capacitive, resistive,
optical, and wave technologies. We focus on the most pop-
ular capacitive multi-touch screens. Our security and usabil-
ity studies involve popular Android devices. When a user
draws with one or multiple fingers on the touchscreen, every
finger will trigger a sequence of touch events which can be
retrieved from Android OS. Every touch event can be char-
acterized by a set of features, among which the following are
relevant to TouchIn: finger ID assigned to and uniquely iden-
tifying every finger during the finger motion, coordinate of
the touch point, timestamp of the touch event, pressure and
size applied to the touchscreen. For the Cartesian touch coor-
dinates, the origin is at the top-left corner of the touchscreen,
and the left-to-right and top-to-down directions define the x-
axis and y-axis directions, respectively. Note that Android
devices can support both landscape and portrait orientations,
in which case the origin will vary. To avoid the confusion,
the touchscreen is automatically locked to the portrait ori-
entation during authentication. In addition, the pressure and
size range from zero to one in Android OS.
4. ADVERSARY MODEL
As discussed, our TouchIn system relies on the device
owner’s self-defined geometric curves, which are referred to
as the curve password hereafter. Motivated by [25], we con-
sider four adversary models from the weakest to strongest.
• Type-I: The adversary knows neither the shapes of the
curve password nor how the device owner draws the
curves to unlock the mobile device.
• Type-II: The adversary can observe how the device
owner draws the curves but not the curve shapes.
• Type-III: The adversary can observe how the device
owner draws the curves and also the rough curve shapes.
For example, the adversary may know that the curve
password is an English letter but not the exact shape.
• Type-IV: The adversary knows exactly how the device
owner draws the curves and also the curve shapes.
5. ANALYSIS OF USER-DRAWN CURVES
(OR CURVE FEATURE SELECTION)
To motivate the TouchIn design, here we analyze many
collected user-drawn curves to show that there are extractable
features fairly consistent for each individual user and also
distinguishable among different users.
5.1 Data Collection
We recruited 30 volunteers (six female and 24 male) over a
two-week period, all of whom are aged 20 to 30 and pursuing
their BE/MS/PhD degrees in Electrical Engineering or Com-
puter Science.1 The experiments were done on two Google
Nexus 7 tablets with 1.6 GHz NVIDIA Tegra 3 quad-core
processor, 1G RAM, 16G internal storage, a 7-inch capaci-
tive multi-touch screen, and Android 4.2 OS. Each volunteer
was first briefed about 10 minutes for our research studies
and was asked to close his/her eyes while drawing on the
touchscreen to emulate the sightless requirement. In addi-
tion, each volunteer was asked to independently decide three
different curves with each involving one finger (single-curve
for short) and three others with each involving multiple fin-
gers of the same hand (multi-curve for short). Finally, each
volunteer was instructed to draw each of his/her own six
curves 20 to 50 times, leading to 3600 single-curve samples
and 3600 multi-curve samples.
5.2 Data Analysis
We extract 10 time series from the touch event data associ-
ated with each single/multi-curve drawing, corresponding to
10 different curve features: x-coordinate, y-coordinate, cur-
vature, x-velocity, y-velocity, x-acceleration, y-acceleration,
direction, touch pressure, and touch size. The details of these
features are further introduced in Section 7.2.
91The data collection process has gone through the IRB
approval.
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9(a) x-coordinate 9(b) y-coordinate
Figure 1: Coordinates of touch points.
9(a) Velocity in x direction 9(b) Velocity in y direction
Figure 2: Velocity of curve drawing.
9(a) Acceleration in x direc-
tion
9(b) Acceleration in y direc-
tion
Figure 3: Acceleration of curve drawing.
9(a) Curve direction 9(b) Curve curvature
Figure 4: Direction and curvature.
Fig. 1 to Fig. 5 compare the curve features of two differ-
ent samples of the same single-curve by the same randomly-
chosen user (Samples 1 and 2) with the sample by a different
randomly-chosen user (Sample 3). We can see that all the
curve features above except touch size have quite consistent
patterns for the same user and very different patterns for two
different users. Similar results are obtained for multi-curves
and omitted here for lack of space.
9(a) Touch pressure 9(b) Touch size
Figure 5: Touch pressure and size.
9(a) K-S test on single curve
9(b) K-S test on multiple curves
9(c) K-S test on touch pressure and size
Figure 6: K-S test results.
We further confirm the above observation via the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) on data collected
from 10 users among 30 users to evaluate the statistic prop-
erty of each curve feature. This leads to 780 single-curve
samples and 780 multi-curve samples. The two-sample K-S
test is the most useful and popular nonparametric method for
comparing two samples. It outputs a p-value indicating the
probability that two given samples are drawn from the same
4
distribution or not. The larger the p-value is, the more likely
the two samples come from the same distribution, and vice
versa.
Fig. 6 shows the K-S test results, where the x-axis denotes
different metrics, and the y-axis denotes the p-value. For
each metric, the p-values are drawn in the box plot, and yel-
low empty (green shadowed) boxes show the distributions
of p-values for different samples of the same user (of differ-
ent users). The top and bottom of each box represent the
75th and the 25th percentiles of the p-value, respectively,
and the middle bar denotes the median of the p-value. In
addition, the upper and lower bars represent the upper and
lower bounds of the p-value, respectively. For each metric,
the less the overlap between the corresponding yellow empty
box and green shadowed box, the better the metric is for dis-
tinguishing different users. We can observe that all the 10
curve features above except touch size are very good met-
rics for distinguishing different users, thus providing a solid
basis for our TouchIn design.
6. TOUCHIN OVERVIEW
In this section, we give an overview of the TouchIn sys-
tem. As shown in Fig. 7, TouchIn is composed of an enroll-
ment phase and a verification phase.
The enrollment phase is to acquire an authentication tem-
plate from the device owner’s self-defined curves. In partic-
ular, the user is prompted to freely draw with one or mul-
tiple fingers of his choice on the touchscreen. A Touch
Monitoring module is designed to track the motion of
every finger by invoking Andriod APIs and record the touch-
event data for every finger as a series of 4-tuples (finger
ID, coordinate, timestamp, pressure). By connecting the co-
ordinates in accordance with the timestamps, we can ob-
tain the highly approximate curve drawn by every finger.
TouchIn allows the user to hold the device in arbitrary ways
and draw on any region of the touchscreen. This property
is enabled by a Data Processing module to adjust the
orientation of and normalize every curve. TouchIn uses ten
features related to the geometric properties of a curve, how it
is drawn, and who draws it, including x-position, y-position,
direction, curvature, x-velocity, y-velocity, x-acceleration,
y-acceleration, finger pressure, and hand geometry, respec-
tively. So a Feature Extraction module is designed
to extract hand geometry data, and a time series of feature
values for each of the rest nine features. Finally, the ex-
tracted feature data are inputted into a Classifier Training
module to generate an authentication template, which is stored
on the mobile device. The Classifier Trainingmod-
ule also outputs the weights assigned to every feature when
composing the authentication template. Generating a high-
quality template may need the device owner to draw multiple
times in (approximately) the same way, which we will seek
to minimize for usability concerns.
During the verification phase, anyone attempting to un-
lock the device is prompted to input a password without
any hint given. Every finger’s input will be treated as a
single curve. The same first three modules in the enroll-
ment phase are used to extract ten features from every input.
Then the feature data from all finger inputs are input into a
Verification module for comparison with the authen-
tication template. If there is a match, the user is consid-
ered legitimate and allowed in; otherwise, the user can retry.
The user is considered unauthorized and denied access after
a threshold number of failed attempts.
7. ENROLLMENT
In this section, we detail the design of the enrollment phase
in accordance with the diagram in Fig. 7.
7.1 Data Processing
This module is invoked after the device owner finishes
drawing by lifting his fingers and takes the resulting 4-tuple
touch-event data as input. The following submodules are
then executed sequentially.
7.1.1 Orientation Adjustment
TouchIn does not require the user to hold the device in
any specific way or draw in designated regions. As said,
this user-friendly feature is important for satisfying the sight-
less requirement as well as thwarting shoulder-surfing and
smudge attacks. The consequence is that multiple attempted
drawings of the same curve on different touchscreen regions
will lead to different sets of touch coordinates, which are un-
likely to compare. To handle this situation, we design two
methods to adjust the curve orientations, which apply when
one or multiple curves are detected, respectively.
Single-curve orientation adjustment
The basic idea of this technique is to adjust the curve
orientation based on some feature points of the curve. As-
sume that the curve is associated with l touch coordinates
denoted by {(xi, yi)}li=1. We first compute the coordinate
(xa, ya) of the curve’s center point as xa =
∑l
i=1 xi/l and
ya =
∑l
i=1 yi/l. Then we move the curve along horizontal
and vertical directions until the center point becomes the ori-
gin of a Cartesian coordinate system. After this movement,
the l coordinates become {(x′i, y′i)}li=1, where x′i = xi−xa,
and y′i = yi − ya. The next step is to decide the start-
ing and ending points of the curve. Note that every fin-
ger contacts with the touchscreen will generate some closer
coordinates with almost identical timestamps, and it is un-
likely to reproduce every finger contact. This means that
even if we want to draw the same curve in exactly the same
way, the starting and ending points of the curve may still be
different. To accommodate this variation, we compute an
average starting point with coordinate (xs, ys) as the aver-
age of the first ηs coordinates in time and an average end-
ing point with coordinate (xe, ye) as the average of the last
ηe coordinates in time, where ηs and ηe are empirical sys-
tem parameters. Finally, we draw an arrow from (xs, ys)
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Figure 7: The TouchIn system architecture.
to (xe, ye) and then rotate the curve until the arrow direc-
tion is the same as that of the x-axis. After this rotation,
the l coordinates of the curve become {(x′′i , y′′i )}li=1, where
x′′i = x
′
i cosα + y
′
i sinα, y
′′
i = −x′i sinα + y′i cosα, and
α = arctan ye−ysxe−xs . Fig. 8 shows an example, where the
solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond to the original
one, the one after movement, and the one after rotation, re-
spectively.
If the distance between the average starting and ending
points is very small, i.e.,
√
(xs − xe)2 + (ys − ye)2 ≤ ξ
for a very small system parameter ξ, the average starting
and ending points are likely to be different even if the same
user tries to draw the same curve multiple times. As a re-
sult, the very short arrow from the average starting point
to the average ending point may have opposite directions
for different drawings of the same curve. If we still ro-
tate the curve as above, the same user’s multiple drawings
may not match. To handle this situation, we further de-
fine an anchor point with coordinate (xr, yr), where xr =
(xs + xe)/2, and yr = (ys + ye)/2. Then we draw an arrow
from the origin to the anchor point and rotate the curve until
the arrow direction is the same as that of the x-axis. Finally,
the l coordinates of the curve become {(x′′i , y′′i )}li=1, where
x′′i = x
′
i cosβ + y
′
i sinβ, y
′′
i = −x′i sinβ + y′i cosβ, and
β = arctan yrxr . This technique, however, cannot be applied
when the average starting and ending points are sufficiently
far from each other. An example for this case is shown in
Fig. 9, where the solid, dashed, and dotted curves correspond
to the original one, the one after movement, and the one after
rotation, respectively.
Multi-curve orientation adjustment
The orientations of multiple curves can be similarly ad-
justed. In particular, assume that the device owner usesM ∈
[2, 5] fingers to simultaneously draw M curves. We denote
the original coordinates of the ith (∀i ∈ [1,M ]) curve by
{(xi,j , yi,j)}lij=1. We first compute the average starting point
of the first curve with coordinate (x1,s, y1,s) as the aver-
age of the first ηs ones in {(x1,j , y1,j)}l1j=1. Then we move
the M curves together along horizontal and vertical direc-
tions until the average starting point becomes the origin. The
li coordinates of the ith (∀i ∈ [1,M ]) curve thus become
{(x′i,j , y′i,j)}lij=1, where x′i,j = xi,j−x1,s, and y′i,j = yi,j−
y1,s. Then we compute the average starting point of the sec-
ond curve with coordinate (x′2,s, y
′
2,s) as the average of the
first ηs ones in {(x′2,j , y′2,j)}l2j=1. Finally, we draw an ar-
row from the origin to (x′2,s, y
′
2,s) and rotate the M curves
together until the arrow direction follows the x-axis. Af-
ter this rotation, the li coordinates of the ith (∀i ∈ [1,M ])
curve change to {(x′′i,j , y′′i,j)}lij=1, where x′′i,j = x′i,j cos γ +
y′i,j sin γ, y
′′
i,j = −x′i,j sin γ+y′i,j cos γ, and γ = arctan
y′2,s
x′2,s
.
Fig. 10 gives an example where the solid, dashed, and dotted
curves refer to the original ones, the ones after movement,
and the ones after rotation, respectively.
For this method to work, the device owner needs to put
his M fingers always in the same order on the touchscreen,
which is fairly easy according to our experimental studies.
This requirement also implies that the touching order of his
M fingers can also be implicitly used as a partial password.
Specifically, although the adversary may manage to observe
the shapes of the M curves and reproduce them, the order in
which theM fingers touch the screen is much more subtle to
observe. As a result, the M curves drawn by the adversary
may be ordered very differently from those drawn by the de-
vice owner. It follows that the adversary’s M curves after
the above orientation adjustment may be very different from
those of the device owner, in which case the authentication
attempt will fail.
7.1.2 Normalization
Even if the device owner can accurately reproduce his
curve shapes, it is often more difficult for him to memorize
6
Figure 8: Single-curve orientation adjustment: case 1.
Figure 9: Single-curve orientation adjustment: case 2.
and reproduce the curve lengths. The normalization sub-
module is designed to handle this situation and applies to
both single-curve and multi-curve cases. Consider the multi-
curve case as an example. Recall that the li coordinates of
the ith curve change to {(x′′i,j , y′′i,j)}lij=1. We define the nor-
malized li coordinates as {(x¯i,j , y¯i,j)}lij=1, where
x¯i,j =
x′′i,j −min{x′′i,k}lik=1
max{x′′i,k}lik=1 −min{x′′i,k}lik=1
,
and
y¯i,j =
y′′i,j −min{y′′i,k}lik=1
max{y′′i,k}lik=1 −min{y′′i,k}lik=1
.
The same method also applies to the single-curve case.
7.2 Feature Extraction
Then we extract ten features from the touch event data
for every curve. The following description applies to the ith
curve (∀i ∈ [1,M ]) of the multi-curve case and also applies
to the single-curve case after slightly changing the notation.
• x- and y-coordinates: Ci = {(x¯i,j , y¯i,j)}lij=1.
)y,(x s1,s1,
Figure 10: Multi-curve orientation adjustment.
• Curvature: The curvature is the amount by which a
geometric object deviates from being flat or straight.
The curvature at point (x¯i,j , y¯i,j) can be derived as
κi,j =
4Ψyi,j∆
x
i,j − 4Ψxi,j∆yi,j
((∆xi,j)
2 + (∆yi,j)
2)3/2
, (1)
where
∆xi,j = (x¯i,j+1 − x¯i,j−1)/2,
∆yi,j = (y¯i,j+1 − y¯i,j−1)/2,
Ψyi,j = (y¯i,j+1 − 2y¯i,j + y¯i,j−1),
Ψxi,j = (x¯i,j+1 − 2x¯i,j + x¯i,j−1) .
• x- and y-velocity: The x-velocity and y-velocity of
touch-event j ∈ [2, li] are defined as
Vxi,j =
x¯i,j − x¯i,j−1
ti,j − ti,j−1 , (2)
Vyi,j =
y¯i,j − y¯i,j−1
ti,j − ti,j−1 , (3)
where ti,j and ti,j−1 denote the timestamp of the jth
and (j − 1)th touch event, respectively.
• x- and y-acceleration: The acceleration of the jth touch
event is defined as
Axi,j =
Vxi,j − Vxi,j−1
ti,j − ti,j−1 , (4)
Ayi,j =
Vyi,j − Vyi,j−1
ti,j − ti,j−1 . (5)
• Direction: The direction at (x¯i,j , y¯i,j) is defined as
αi,j = arctan
y¯i,j+1 − y¯i,j
x¯i,j+1 − x¯i,j . (6)
• Touch pressure: The touch pressure on the touchscreen
is hardly observable by the adversary and can thus also
be used as some behavioral characteristic. Android OS
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reports the finger pressure for every touch event as a
value ranging from 0 (no pressure at all) to 1 (normal
pressure), and can be denoted as Pi = {pi,j}lij=1.
• Hand geometry: Due to the uniqueness of each user’s
hand size and shape, the distance between any two fin-
gers (known as hand geometry information) can also be
used to uniquely identify a user. M fingers together de-
termine
(
M
2
)
finger pairs, where the distance between
the ith and jth fingers is computed as
`i,j =
√
(x¯i,s − x¯j,s)2 + (y¯i,s − y¯j,s)2 (7)
where (x¯i,s, y¯i,s) and (x¯j,s, y¯j,s) denote the normal-
ized coordinates of the average starting points of the
ith and jth curves, respectively. These
(
M
2
)
distance
metrics compose the hand geometry information.
7.3 Classifier Training
This module is to obtain an optimal classifier based on
the extracted feature data from the training set. In what fol-
lows, we first discuss the comparison of two arbitrary curves.
We then discuss how to assign optimal weights to coordi-
nate, curvature, velocity, acceleration, and direction features.
Since hand geometry information does not have an associ-
ated time series, we discuss how to incorporate it into the
authentication template in Section 7.4.
7.3.1 Curve Comparison
As said, every finger-drawn curve is associated with nine
time series, corresponding to the x-coordinate, y-coordinate,
curvature, x-velocity, y-velocity, x-acceleration, y-acceleration,
direction and touch pressure features, respectively. To com-
pare two arbitrary curves, we use Dynamic Time Warping
(DTW) [30] to compute the distance between each of the
nine time-series pairs. For example, consider one pair of
time series, denoted by S1 and S2 with n1 and n2 feature val-
ues, respectively, where n1 may not equal n2. To compare
S1 and S2, we first construct an n1 × n2 distance matrix, in
which the value in each cell (i, j) represents the absolute dis-
tance between the ith feature value of S1 and the jth feature
value of S2. DTW finds the shortest path from cell (1, 1)
to cell (n1, n2), along which the total value of the cells is
defined as the distance between S1 and S2. We denote by
{di}9i=1 the DTW distance results for the x-coordinate, y-
coordinate, curvature, x-velocity, y-velocity, x-acceleration,
y-acceleration, direction and touch pressure features, respec-
tively. Then we need to find a combination of {di}9i=1 to
classify the curves from both authorized and unauthorized
users, where wi denotes the weight assigned to feature i.
7.3.2 Weight Assignment
The objective of weight assignment is to assign differ-
ent weights to different features to minimize false negatives
and positives. For this purpose, TouchIn will come with λ
random curves, each also having nine time series of feature
data. Assume that the device owner is prompted to draw ev-
ery chosen curve ω times, where each drawing is referred
to as a sample curve. These ω sample curves along with
the λ preloaded curves compose a training set. Then we
randomly select one of the ω sample curves as a reference
curve and use DTW to compare it with every other curve in
the training set. For convenience, we denote the reference
curve by CURVE0 and every other curve by CURVEi for
i ∈ [1, ω + λ − 1]. We also let {di,j}9j=1 denote the nine
DTW distance results between CURVE0 and CURVEi.
We formulate weight assignment as a classification prob-
lem. In particular, all the training curves can be classified
into two classes: the ω sample curves of the device owner
belong to Class I (` = 0), while the λ random curves be-
long to Class II (` = 1). We use the Logistic Regression
(LR) algorithm [31] as the classification algorithm to distin-
guish the two classes. In particular, for a two-classification
task, the LR algorithm finds the optimal linear combination
of all features to separate two classes of curves with the min-
imum misclassification cost. For this purpose, we further
introduce a constant d0 = 1 and w0 as the corresponding
weight for d0. Let di = [d0, di,1, di,2, · · · , di,9]T be the dis-
tance vector and w = [w0, w1, w2, · · · , w9]T be the weight
vector of CURVEi (∀i ∈ [1, ω + λ − 1]). The linear com-
bination of the distance and weight vectors is expressed by
wTdi = w0 +w1di,1 +w2di,2 + · · ·+w9di,9. We proceed
to define
h(wTdi) =
1
1 + e−wTdi
, (8)
where h(·) is the sigmoid function with the range [0, 1]. In
particular, if wTd < 0, then h(wTd) < 0.5, and if wTd >
0, then h(wTd) ≥ 0.5. Then CURVEi can be classified as
`i =
{
0, h(wTdi) < 0.5,
1, h(wTdi) ≥ 0.5 .
(9)
We need to make sure that the majority of the sample curves
can be classified into Class I (low false negatives) and most
of the λ preloaded curves can be classified into class II (low
false positives). An ideal classifier should have h(wTdi)
much smaller (or larger) than 0.5 if CURVEi is a sample (or
preloaded) curve. We thus define the misclassification cost
for CURVEi as
C(h(wTdi), `i) =
{
− log(1− h(wTdi)), `i = 0,
− log(h(wTdi)), `i = 1.
(10)
The overall misclassification cost is then defined as
J (w) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
C(h(wTdi), `i)
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
`i log h(w
Tdi)
+ (1− `i) log(1− h(wTdi))
)
,
(11)
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where n = ω+λ−1. Our final goal is thus to find the weight
vector w which can minimize J (w).
We use the gradient descent method [32] to solve the above
minimization problem. In particular, we update every weight
wj as
wj = wj − α∂J (w)
∂wj
= wj − α
n∑
i=1
(h(wTdi)− `i)di,j ,
(12)
where α and di,j denote the learning step and the ith curve’s
jth DTW distance, respectively. The updating process ends
when J (w) stops decreasing, in which case we obtain the
optimal weight vector w.
There are four remarks to make. First, the weight vec-
tor will be different for different device owners, which to-
tally depend on his ω sample curves and the λ preloaded
random curves. Second, the weight vectors resulting from
different reference curves chosen from the ω sample curves
are very similar, which have been confirmed by our experi-
ments as well. Third, if the device owner uses multi-curve
authentication, the weight vectors for different curve pass-
word are highly likely to be different. Finally, if multiple
sample curves are chosen as reference curves, the above min-
imization process needs to run for each of them.
7.4 Creation of Authentication Templates
The final authentication template includes the feature data
of every chosen reference curve and its corresponding weight
vector from the Classifier Training module, which
is referred to as a curve sub-template. If the device owner
uses M ≥ 2 curve password with ω sample inputs during
the enrollment phase, the authentication template also in-
cludes a hand-geometry sub-template. The hand-geometry
sub-template is denoted by [−i , 
+
i ], where 
−
i and 
+
i de-
note the minimum and maximum distances between the ith
finger pair among the ω samples of the M curves.
8. VERIFICATION
The verification phase starts when someone tries to un-
lock the mobile device. The user will be prompted to input
his password. The verification phase uses the same Touch
Monitoring, Data Processing, and Feature
Extraction modules to extract the data for the ten fea-
tures. The extracted data are then inputted into a Verification
module, where three tests are performed.
• Curve test: If single-curve authentication is used, the
candidate curve is tested using the trained classifier. If
it is classified as Class I (or Class II), the curve test suc-
ceeds (or fails). If multi-curve authentication is used,
every candidate curve in the input need to be tested
within the corresponding classifier. If all the candidate
curves are classified as Class I, the curve test succeeds
and fails otherwise.
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Figure 11: Impact of the training-set size.
• Hand-geometry test: This test applies to multi-curve
cases only. If the distance between every finger pair
in the input falls between the corresponding minimum
and maximum distances in the handle-geometry tem-
plate, this test succeeds and fails otherwise.
The user is considered legitimate and allowed in only when
his input passes all the tests above; otherwise, he is denied
access. Although we have tried to minimize false negatives,
an authorized user may be denied access in very rare sit-
uations, e.g., due to sudden memory loss. One remedy is
to let the authentication template include multiple reference
curves and their corresponding classifiers. The curve test
is said to succeed if the candidate curve(s) is classified as
Class I by any classifier. As another remedy, TouchIn can be
combined with a traditional password-based authentication
system which is normally too inconvenient to use and only
invoked as the last resort. For example, a visually impaired
person may ask his friend to help unlock his mobile device
using a super password too difficult for himself to input.
9. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we report the experimental security and
usability studies of TouchIn on Google Nexus 7 tablets. In
what follows, we first introduce our data-collection process
and key performance metrics. Then we report the evaluation
results for both security and usability features.
9.1 Data Acquisition
We used the same data collection process in Section 5.1, in
which 3600 single-curve password samples and 3600 multi-
curve password samples were collected from 30 volunteers
who closed their eyes while drawing on the touchscreen. In
addition, we recruited 10 more volunteers with similar back-
ground to mimic attackers. We made videos of legitimate
volunteers drawing curves on the touchscreen and showed
the videos to attackers. Since it is infeasible to ask each at-
tacker to watch too many videos, we let each attacker watch
the videos of three randomly selected victims with each draw-
ing one curve password randomly chosen from his/her three.
In accordance with the adversary models in Section 4, we
considered the following attacks.
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• Attack 1: one-time observation. The attackers were
allowed to observe how the victims input their curve
password once without knowing other information. More
specifically, we first showed the video of each victim’s
authentication process with one finger to each attacker
once and asked each attacker to make five authentica-
tion attempts for each victim. Next, we showed the
video of each victim’s authentication process with two
fingers to each attacker once and also asked each at-
tacker to mimic each victim for five times. We col-
lected 3× 5× 10× 2 = 300 mimicked curve samples
for three victims in total for this attack.
• Attack 2: four-time observations. The attackers con-
tinued observing the videos of single-finger and two-
finger authentication processes of each victim three more
times and then produced five mimicked curve samples
for each victim. Besides, ten attackers also observed
the video of two-finger authentication process of each
victim three more times, and produced another five mim-
icked curve samples. We also collected 3×5×10×2 =
300 mimicked curve samples for this attack.
• Attack 3: four-time observations and rough curve
information. The attackers were additionally provided
with the rough shapes of each victim’s curve password
of the three victims, e.g., whether the curve password
is an ellipse or a rectangle. Then each attacker was
asked to make five attempts with both one finger and
two fingers for each victim, leading to 3×5×10×2 =
300 mimicked curve samples for this attack.
• Attack 4: four-time observations and exact curve
information. The attackers were finally presented with
the exact shape of the curve password. Each of them
then made five more attempts with both one finger and
two fingers for each victim, producing another 3× 5×
10× 2 = 300 mimicked curve samples.
Attacks 1 and 2 above correspond to the Type-II adversary
introduced in Section 4, and Attacks 3 and 4 correspond to
the Type-III and Type-IV adversaries, respectively. Since
Type-I attackers refer to those totally blind to the curve pass-
word, we can simply evaluate their impact by testing the col-
lected curve samples of legitimate users against those of oth-
ers, as to be shown later.
9.2 Performance Metrics
We adopt the following performance metrics.
• ROC Curve. In signal detection theory, a receiver op-
erating characteristic curve, or simply ROC curve, is a
graphical plot commonly used to illustrate the perfor-
mance of a binary classifier as its discrimination thresh-
old is varied. A ROC curve is created by plotting the
true-positive rate versus the false-positive rate. More
specifically, let #TP, #FP, #TN, and #FN denote the
number of true positive, false positive, true negative
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Figure 12: Performance of single-curve authentication.
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Figure 13: Performance of multi-curve authentication.
and false negative, respectively. The true-positive and
false-positive rates are calculated respectively as
TPR =
#TP
#TP + #FN
(13)
and
FPR =
#FP
#FP + #TN
. (14)
TouchIn should achieve both a high true-positive rate
and a low false-positive rate.
• Precision-Recall Curve. In our scenario, precision is
the measure of accuracy provided by the authentica-
tion system. It represents the percentage of legitimate
users out of those passing the authentication and can
be computed as
Precision =
#TP
#TP + #FP
. (15)
Recall is the measure of the capability that the authen-
tication system can pass authorized users and is defined
as Recall = TPR.
• Authentication Time. This refers to the time for the
mobile device to decide whether to allow the user in
and should be as short as possible.
9.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present our experimental results to show
the performance of our authentication system.
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Figure 14: Single-curve authentication under attacks.
9.3.1 Performance for Legitimate Authentication
We first demonstrate our system performance for legiti-
mate users only. Recall that each of the 30 volunteers chose
three curve password for single-curve authentication and in-
put each curve 20 to 50 times, producing 3,600 single-curve
samples. Then we randomly chose ω samples for each of the
30× 3 curve password to form a training set of 90ω sample
curves for the classifier. This corresponds to having λ = 89ω
preloaded random curves for each curve password. The rest
curve samples composed a testing set. We did the same for
the 3,600 multi-curve samples. We conducted the evaluation
for every legitimate user each with three different curve pass-
words, and each reported data point represents the average of
90 authentication instances, unless otherwise stated.
Impact of the Training-set Size: We first show the impact
of the training-set size on the classification result. Intuitively,
the larger the training set, the more information provided, the
better the classifier performance. We varied the size of the
training set by changing ω and recorded the corresponding
training-accuracy measurements, testing-accuracy measure-
ments, the false-positive rate, and the false-negative rate.
Fig. 11(a) shows the impact of the training-set size on
training accuracy and testing accuracy of single-curve au-
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Figure 15: Achievable recall and precision under single-
curve authentication.
thentication and multi-curve authentication, respectively, where
the training (or testing) accuracy is defined as the ratio of
true positives and negatives to the total number of curve sam-
ples involved in the training (or testing) process. We can see
that the classification accuracy increases as ω increases and
stays very high as ω ≥ 4. In addition, we can see that the
false-positive and false-negative rates of both single-curve
authentication and multi-curve authentication decrease as ω
increases and stay sufficient low as ω ≥ 5. Such results are
desirable because ω is directionally proportional to the en-
rollment time and thus usability.
Authentication Performance: Now we show the authenti-
cation performance of TouchIn. For each curve password of
every legitimate user, its remaining samples in the testing set
can be regarded as the user’s inputs at different times, while
all the other samples in the testing set can be regarded as
the inputs by a Type-I attacker. For clarity and simplicity,
we report the average results as well as the upper and lower
bounds for all the curve passwords in the precision-recall and
ROC curves.
Fig. 12 illustrates the performance of single-curve authen-
tication. We can see that the average precision-recall curve
is close to the top-right corner, which indicates that our sys-
tem can obtain high precision and high recall simultaneously.
Similarly, the average ROC curve is close to the top-left cor-
ner, which indicates that our system can achieve a high true-
positive rate together with a low false-positive rate. Both
precision-recall and ROC curves show that our system is
good at distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate users.
Fig. 13 demonstrates the performance of multi-curve au-
thentication. Similar to single-curve authentication, our sys-
tem achieves high precision and high recall simultaneously
as well as a high true-positive rate and a low false-positive
rate. In addition, we can see that the average performance
of multi-curve authentication is better than single-curve au-
thentication. This is anticipated because more information is
incorporated in the authentication process.
9.3.2 Performance Under Attacks
In this part, we show the system performance under the
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Figure 16: Multi-curve authentication under attacks.
four attacks defined in Section 9.1.
We first report the performance of single-curve authenti-
cation under attacks. For every attack and each curve pass-
word, we ran the experiments 30 times to obtain the aver-
age precision-recall curves in Fig. 14(a) and ROC curves
in Fig. 14(b), in which every attack is associated with three
identical-colored curves with each corresponding to one vic-
tim. From Fig. 14, we can see that as the attack strength
increases, the performance of our system decreases. This
is anticipated because the attackers know more information
about the curve password as the attack strength increases.
In Fig. 15(a), we show the maximum achievable recall for
each curve password under the four attacks, where the pre-
cision is required to be 100%. It illustrates the trade-off be-
tween security and usability. If a user wants better usability,
i.e., fewer tries needed on average to pass the authentication,
then the system configuration will result in a higher recall
rate. On the other hand, it will be difficult to deal with more
challenging attackers. The maximum precision with a 75%
recall rate is shown in Fig. 15(b). It illustrates how likely
an attacker can pass the authentication by a fixed number of
attempts on average. We can see that our system can reject
all the attacks with an over 90% probability on average.
Next, we show the performance of multi-curve authenti-
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Figure 17: Achievable recall and precision under multi-
curve authentication.
cation under the attacks. The similar trend can be found
in Fig. 16 and Fig. 17. In particular, the system perfor-
mance decreases as the attack strength increases. In addi-
tion, it is obvious that multi-curve authentication performs
better than single-curve authentication under various attack
models. The reason is that multi-curve authentication com-
pares the features of multiple corresponding curves and also
checks other feature such as hand geometry, which are much
more difficult to infer by the attackers.
9.3.3 Computation Overhead
The computation overhead of TouchIn lies in two aspects.
The first is mainly incurred by classifier training in the en-
rollment phase, and the second is mainly caused by feature
extraction, DTW distance calculations, and classification in
the verification phase. The computation overhead should be
sufficiently low for fast enrollment and verification.
Classifier training can be done either on the mobile de-
vice or through a trusted third party as in [13]. Fig. 18(a)
shows the enrollment time for single-curve authentication
when classifier training is done on a Google Nexus 7 tablet
and a Dell desktop with 2.67 GHz CPU, 9 GB RAM, and
Windows 7 64-bit Professional. We can see that the enroll-
ment time on Google Nexus 7 is about 120 seconds when the
training set contains 300 curve samples. Although such en-
rollment time seems long, it is still acceptable because clas-
sifier training is a one-time process and can be done when
the user does not use the mobile device. As in [13], an alter-
native way for classifier training is to outsource it to a trusted
third-party server computing and returning the weight vector
to the user. As shown in Fig. 18(a), the enrollment time on
the Dell desktop is much shorter than that on Google Nexus 7
and can be much more shortened on a more powerful cloud
server. The enrollment time for multi-curve authentication
involvingM curves is approximatelyM times that for multi-
curve authentication.
The verification time for single-curve authentication is shown
in Fig. 18(b). According to our experiments on Google Nexus
7 tablet with Android 4.2, the time for feature extraction and
classification is less than one millisecond and thus negligi-
ble. In contrast, the time for DTW distance calculations in-
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Figure 18: Computation overhead for single-curve au-
thentication.
creases with the number of feature points on an curve pass-
word. To shed some light on the verification overhead, Fig. 18(b)
shows the average time for single-feature DTW distance cal-
culations and the overall verification time which involves the
DTW distance calculations for nine curve features. As we
can see, the average DTW calculation time increases as the
number of curve points increases. According to our exper-
imental data, most curve passwords contain less than 300
points which only cost less than 100 ms for single-feature
DTW distance calculation, and the overall verification time
is below 900 ms. As to multi-curve authentication with M
curves, the verification time is approximately M times the
single-curve verification time.
Table 1: Comparison with existing schemes
Scheme TPR FPRSingle Multiple Single Multiple
TouchIn 97.5% 99.3% 2.3% 2.2%
PassChords [14] 83.7% NA
GEAT [16] 94.6% 4.02%
9.3.4 Comparison with Existing Schemes
Now we compare TouchIn with PassChords [14], the only
known work dedicated to sightless mobile authentication. As
shown in Table 1, TouchIn has a much higher TPR (i.e.,
authentication success rate) than PassChords. In addition,
TouchIn has a sufficiently low FPR, and the FPR information
is not available in [14]. We also observe that PassChords is
vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks. To confirm our obser-
vation, we asked 10 attackers to observe the PassChords au-
thentication process once, twice, three times, and four times,
respectively. 8 out of 10 attackers could successively repeat
the PassChords password after just one observation, and the
rest two could succeed after two observations. In contrast,
TouchIn is highly resilient to shoulder-surfing attacks, as we
have shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 16.
We also compare TouchIn with GEAT [16], a very recent
mobile authentication scheme. We can see that TouchIn has
slightly better TPR and FPR performance than GEAT, but
GEAT does not have the same sightless feature of TouchIn.
9.4 Usability Study
We also evaluated the usability of TouchIn by surveying
Table 2: Usability scores
Mean Standard Deviation Min Median Max
Q1 4.5 0.60698 3 5 5
Q2 4.45 0.60481 3 4.5 5
Q3 4.4 0.68056 3 4.5 5
Q4 4.6 0.59824 3 5 5
Q5 4.35 0.67.82 3 4 5
the experiment volunteers. In particular, we asked them whether
TouchIn is easy to use (Q1), whether curve passwords are
easy to memorize (Q2), whether TouchIn is faster than the
PIN method and Android pattern lock (Q3), whether TouchIn
would be easier to use with more practice (Q4), and their
preference of TouchIn (Q5) over the PIN method and An-
droid pattern lock. The statistic informative of survey scores
are listed in Table 2, where the scores range from one (low-
est) to five (highest). The results indicate that TouchIn is
very easy to use and more preferable than the PIN method
and Android pattern lock.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented and evaluated TouchIn, a novel
sightless two-factor authentication system on multi-touch mo-
bile device. The high security, efficiency, and usability were
confirmed by detailed experiments on Google Nexus 7 tablets.
Our future work includes incorporating more behaviorial char-
acteristics and physiological characteristics as well as the
something-you-have paradigm into our authentication sys-
tem. We also plan to formally analyze the security strength
of curve-based passwords in TouchIn.
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